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ABSTRACT: Argumentative discussion is successful only if, at the concluding stage, both parties can
agree about the result of their enterprise. If they can not, the whole discussion threatens to start all over
again. Dialectical ruling should prevent this from happening. The paper investigates whether dialectical
rules may enforce a decision one way or the other; either by recognizing some arguments as conclusive
or some criticisms as devastating. At the end the pragma-dialectical model appears more successful
than even its protagonists have claimed.
KEYWORDS: concluding stage, conclusive argument, conclusiveness, critical discussion, devastating
criticism, having had one's say, inconclusiveness, Pragma-Dialectics, proofs, recursive definition

1. INTRODUCTION
According to common wisdom, it is easier to get into an argument than to get out of it.
And it is not even that easy to get an argument started; certainly not when one wants
the argument to proceed along sound lines, as stipulated by the pragma-dialectical
model of critical discussion (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, 1992, 2004). As
is commonly known, this model consists of four stages: the confrontation stage, the
opening stage, the argumentation stage, and the concluding stage. In an earlier paper
(Krabbe, 2006) I discussed some of the problems that beset the opening stage and
make it hard to rationally start an argument. This time I want to concentrate on the
concluding stage and the problems that threaten to frustrate the proper ending of an
argumentative discussion.
The concluding stage is the one ‘in which the parties establish what the result
is of an attempt to resolve a difference of opinion’ (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst,
2004, p. 61). Supposing the discussion to have been centered upon one initial
standpoint (thesis), defended by a protagonist and challenged by an antagonist, the
questions that need to be answered in this final stage of discussion are the following:
Given what happened in the confrontation stage, the opening stage, and the
argumentation stage, is the protagonist now obliged to retract his initial standpoint? Is
the antagonist obliged to retract her calling into question of the initial standpoint? Or
is neither party obliged to retract its original position? If the first question can be
answered in the affirmative, the difference of opinion has been resolved in favor of
the antagonist; if the second, in favor of the protagonist; otherwise, no resolution has
been achieved.
Section 2 will describe some predicaments connected with the concept of a
concluding stage of argumentative discussion. Section 3 will investigate whether the
idea of a conclusive argument or a devastating criticism can help us to make the
concept more definite. A first impression is, that this will not be the case. Section 4
and 5 continue the investigation of conclusiveness in a pragma-dialectical direction,
Krabbe, E.C.W. (2007). Predicaments of the concluding stage. In H.V. Hansen, et. al. (Eds.), Dissensus
and the Search for Common Ground, CD-ROM (pp. 1-10). Windsor, ON: OSSA.
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taking it to be a notion that is relative to the discussion at hand. In Section 6 we shall
see that, ultimately, there is little about conclusiveness that is conclusive, but that
nevertheless, within the model of critical discussion, but contrary to the modesty of
the pragma-dialectician’s claims, a concluding stage will always result in the
resolution of the initial difference of opinion. 1
2. SOME PREDICAMENTS
There is a problem about getting to the concluding stage, a problem about what to do
once being in the concluding stage, and also a problem of getting out of the
concluding stage.
To start with getting to the concluding stage: if there is a predicament here,
this can not literally be a predicament of the concluding stage, but should rather be
characterized as a predicament of the argumentation stage, because it is from the
argumentation stage that one must enter the concluding stage. When should this
transition take place? When neither of the discussants has anything left to say? But
that could take an indefinite time. Perhaps someone should, after a reasonable period,
propose that the discussion be concluded. But who of the discussants can rightfully
claim to be in the position to take the initiative and to say: ‘Now we have had enough
arguments and comments, let’s conclude this session.’? And can such an
announcement be proclaimed, without any constraints, at any moment of the
development of the argumentation stage?
In our salad days, when my brother and I had many arguments, there were no
constraints. The concluding stage was announced by a forceful statement of one’s
opinion and completed by a loud utterance of ‘Bang!’. Whoever first remembered that
this was the way to end any heated dispute between us, could avail himself of this
practical method. For winning the day, just state your final opinion on the issue,
followed by ‘Bang!’. Later on, we felt this was too easy and one had to utter a more
complicated formula: not just ‘Bang!’, but ‘Bang! Stop it! Period!’, exactly in that
order. This, of course, was much harder to remember in a heated dispute. I think it
was my brother who at a certain occasion, after I had performed this little ceremony,
and thought my proposition to be safe, continued the argument saying ‘Yes, but we
must change this a bit’. This, of course, was intolerable. So, in the end, the formula
was extended to “read: ‘Bang! Stop it! Period! No alterations!’ it worked fine. For one
thing, this rule did not spoil our arguments, for in the heat of discussion it usually
lasted quite some time before anyone remembered about the way we had decided
disputes could be ended.
Yet, one feels that in critical discussion one should observe some more
sophisticated protocol for entering the concluding stage. The task for the theoretician,
then, is to find a set of dialectic rules that prevent indefinite and senseless dilation of
the argumentation stage, without giving either discussant the power to curb the other’s
fundamental rights to bring forward arguments or criticisms.
Second, once the discussants have entered the concluding the concluding stage
they are confronted with the problem of what to do next. The predicament here is that,
in order to establish the yield of their discussion, they must either take the results of
the argumentation stage for granted or make an assessment of the results of the
argumentation stage. In the first case, the whole concluding stage would be nugatory,
1
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since everything has been established in the argumentation stage, whereas in the
second case the attempt to assess the results of the argumentation will involve the use
of arguments and hence catapult the discussants back into the same or another
argumentation stage.
That it is often not acceptable that people at the concluding stage revert to
earlier stages is nicely illustrated by the case of Mrs. Hans, the notorious antagonist
figuring in one of the exercises of a pragma-dialectical textbook (Van Eemeren et al.,
2002, pp. 33-36). The exercise presents the case of a discussion at Harrods’s
department store about whether or not to join a program that would make ex-prisoners
available as employees. Mrs. Hans is adamantly opposed to this idea: ‘Well , in my
view it is sheer madness to employ a bunch of prisoners, and that twenty per cent of
my staff members are to be replaced by criminals.’ But after some argument from the
other side, she seems to be entering the concluding stage when she admits: ‘Well, if
that’s the case, then I can’t really say anything more against it.’ However, she
immediately returns to the confrontation stage, adding: ‘But I still can’t agree to it’.
As the discussion moves towards a positive decision on this issue, she sticks to this
attitude of reverting to the confrontation stage, yelling ‘No criminals in my
department!’ and claiming to have insurmountable (but unexplained) objections.
Even if such extremes as those exemplified by Mrs. Hans can be avoided, it is
easy to imagine that each concluding stage in which the upshot of an argumentation
stage has to be summarized and evaluated, will amply occasion fresh differences of
opinion, or revive old ones, leading to more confrontation stages, opening stages, and
argumentation stages, that must be ended by concluding stages in which the problem
recurs. This yields a third predicament, that of how to conclude the concluding stage.
3. CONCLUSIVE ARGUMENTS AND DEVASTATING CRITICISMS
The predicaments of the concluding stage would not be so threatening if only we had
definite, decidable and practicable concepts of what constitutes a conclusive argument
for a thesis and of what constitutes a devastating criticism of a thesis. A devastating
criticism of a thesis could of course consist of a conclusive argument for the opposite
thesis, but it may also amount to a conclusive argument that no conclusive argument
for the thesis exists.
Once in possession of such concepts and related decision procedures,
discussants could agree to use the following procedure for their concluding stage
(assuming there to be just one initial thesis): (1) During the argumentation stage, each
discussant may open a concluding stage, but will have to pay a fine if the concluding
stage does not lead to a resolution of the difference of opinion. This fine is needed to
prevent the discussants from needlessly interrupting the process of argumentation. (2)
In the concluding stage the discussants establish the result of their discussion by first
making an inventory of all arguments for the thesis that were, during the
argumentation stage, presented by the protagonist. They then apply their decision
procedure for conclusiveness to each argument. As soon as it has been found that one
of the arguments was conclusive, they declare the protagonist to have won the
discussion. (3) They also make an inventory of every criticism of the thesis that was,
during the argumentation stage, put forward by the antagonist. They then apply their
decision procedure for conclusiveness to each criticism. As soon as it has been found
that one of the criticisms was conclusive, and therefore devastating, they declare the
antagonist to have won the discussion. (4) If it turns out that, during the
argumentation stage, neither a conclusive argument for the thesis nor a devastating
criticism of thesis was put forward, the discussion will be declared a draw.
3
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There is one serious drawback to this procedure; that is that, according to
Ralph Johnson at least, conclusive arguments do not exist (Johnson, 2000, pp. 228236). According to Johnson, in order ‘to be conclusive, an argument would have to
display four properties’ (p. 232):
(C1) Its premises would have to be unimpeachable or uncriticizable. (p. 233.)
(C2) The connection between premises and the conclusion would have to be
unimpeachable−the strongest possible. (p. 233.)
(C3) A conclusive argument is one that can successfully (and rationally)
resist every attempt at legitimate criticism. (p. 233.)
(C4) The argument would be regarded as a conclusive argument. (p. 234;
stress added)
Johnson argues that no argument ‘has satisfied all these conditions’ (p. 234).
But are not mathematical proofs the paradigm examples of conclusive
arguments? Johnson holds that ‘though mathematical proofs are conclusive, they are
not arguments and so are not conclusive arguments’(p. 232). But here, to see whether
proofs are arguments, we must distinguish between formal and informal proofs
(Krabbe, 1997). Formal proofs, being purely formal objects or syntactic structures, are
indeed not by themselves arguments, though they can be used to express arguments,
but then these arguments they express (through some process of interpretation) are
themselves at most informal proofs. Informal proofs I hold to be arguments, but then,
I must admit, these proofs are seldom if ever conclusive (cf. Lakatos, 1976). Even the
(informal) proof showing that there is no greatest prime number, may be less
conclusive than Johnson seems to assume (2000, p. 232), since one could question the
underlying logic or deny the possibility of multiplying arbitrarily big numbers. For
Johnson, Euclid’s proof is conclusive but not an argument, whereas I would hold that
it is an argument, and a very strong one, but not in all respects conclusive. A
formalization of Euclid’s proof may be called conclusive for the system in which it is
formalized, but would not be an argument. Neither Johnson nor I have found a
conclusive argument in this case.
Again, are there any conclusive arguments? Of course, Johnson will not hold
his argument that there are no conclusive arguments to be a conclusive argument.
Neither do I. Nevertheless, Johnson’s analysis of what it would mean for an argument
to be conclusive convincingly shows that conclusive arguments will be extremely rare
in argumentative practice and that, consequently, the notion of conclusiveness is
otiose; it can certainly not serve as a foundation for the regimentation of the
concluding stage. As long as conclusiveness remains a necessary condition for either
the protagonist or the antagonist to be declared winner of the discussion (as is the case
in the procedures mentioned above), hardly any interesting discussion will ever be
won or lost. This means that discussions will generally fail to resolve differences of
opinion.
4. CONCLUSIVE DEFENSE
Given that the notion of conclusiveness does not work, it may seem surprising that the
notions of conclusive defense and conclusive attack nevertheless function prominently
in the pragma-dialectic model of critical discussion (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst,
2004, Ch. 6, esp. Rule 9 and Rule 14). But here those notions are not used in the
absolute sense of defenses or attacks that would settle matters to all eternity, but in a
sense relative to a particular discussion with particular discussion rules, adopted
4
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procedures, and agreed common starting points. The claim is that relative to all these
matters (to be settled in the opening stage) defenses and attacks can be conclusive.
What constitutes a conclusive defense is given by Rule 9a:
The protagonist has conclusively defended an initial standpoint or substandpoint by means of a complex speech act of argumentation if he has
successfully defended both the propositional content called into question by
the antagonist and its force of justification or refutation called into question
by the antagonist. (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, p. 151.)
This rule should be understood bearing the following things in mind. Before the start
of the argumentation stage, the initial standpoint has been challenged (called into
question) by the antagonist. It is now up to the protagonist to defend his initial
standpoint by means of a complex speech act of argumentation, which counts as a
provisional defense of the standpoint (Rule 6a, p. 144). There are two ways for the
antagonist to react: she may call into question either the ‘propositional content’ of the
argumentation (here to be called: its premises) or (in the case of a positive standpoint)
its justificatory force (here to be called: its link). 2 Both links and premises will be
called inputs of the arguments in which they figure. Rule 9a is obviously not intended
to declare argumentative defenses conclusive when the antagonist has not yet had the
opportunity to call into question certain inputs. Rather it presupposes that the
antagonist had her say, that is, that she had the opportunity to call into question each
and every input she wishes (in the spirit of Rule 10, p. 152). The gist of Rule 9a (in
the case of a positive standpoint) can now be formulated as follows: If and only if
every input of a protagonist’s argument that was called into question by the antagonist
(where the antagonist had every opportunity to do so) has been successfully defended
by the protagonist, has the protagonist conclusively defended his positive standpoint
by means of the argument.
To understand what it means to conclusively defend a standpoint, we are thus
referred to the notion of a successful defense of the inputs of arguments. For this we
must turn to Rules 7a (p. 147) and 8a (p. 150). These rules refer to certain procedures,
or tests, that the discussants are supposed to have agreed upon in the opening stage.
The intersubjective identification procedure can be applied to premises and will check
whether a premise is identical to one of the propositions that was, at the opening
stage, accepted by both discussants (pp. 145-147). 3 The intersubjective inference
procedure can be applied to links (in cases where the reasoning has been completely
expressed) and tests for deductive validity (p. 148). The intersubjective testing
procedure can also be applied to links, and checks whether the argumentation scheme
that was employed is admissible (according to agreements at the opening stage) and
whether it was applied correctly (pp. 149-150). 4 When an input has been tested by
some procedure that applies to it, and with positive result, it will be called a fixed
input. Rule 7a and 8a stipulate that when an input has become fixed it counts as
having been successfully defended by the protagonist. For links, this is the whole
2
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story, they can only be successfully defended by becoming fixed; that is, by passing
either of the two tests for links. But for premises Rule 7a opens up another way: a
premise will also count as having been successfully defended if it has been ‘accepted
by both parties as a result of a sub-discussion in which the protagonist has
successfully defended a positive sub-standpoint with regard to this propositional
content’ (p. 147). This means that the argument may become complex, for premises
may be defended by further arguments with links and premises, and these premises
again by further argument, and so on. An argument that is not complex will be called
elementary.
If we want to use Rule 7a as a definition of ‘successfully defended’, there is a
slight difficulty with it in as far as a notion of successful defense occurs also in the
definiens. Not that the definition is circular. It is not circular because in the definiens
‘successfully defended’ is applied to standpoints, whereas the definiendum is applied
to premises. The problem is that we are not told what it means for a standpoint to have
been successfully defended. Nevertheless, it seems clear that a standpoint has been
defended successfully if and only if the protagonist won the critical discussion in
which it was defended, that is to say if and only if the antagonist was obliged to
retract the calling into question of the standpoint, something that can be the case if
and only if the standpoint was defended conclusively (Rule 14, p. 154). Thus, for
‘successfully defended’ in the definiens, we may read ‘conclusively defended’. If this
is correct, Rule 7a, in its turn, refers to Rule 9a. Yet, again there is no circularity.
Rather Rules 7a, 8a, and 9a together constitute a recursive definition in which the two
notions, ‘conclusively defended’ and ‘successfully defended’ are simultaneously
defined. This definition can, with respect to a possibly complex argument, be
formulated as follows:
(1) (basic clause) Any input 5 that has been fixed counts as having been
successfully defended (Rules 7a and 8a).
(2) (first inductive clause) Any positive standpoint 6 defended by an elementary
argument all of whose inputs were either not called into question (the
antagonist having had every opportunity to do so) or successfully defended
counts as having been conclusively defended (Rule 9a).
(3) (second inductive clause) Any premise 7 that is the propositional content of a
positive standpoint that has been conclusively defended counts as successfully
defended (Rule 7a).
(4) (extremal clause) No positive standpoint shall count as conclusively defended
and no input shall count as successfully defended, unless this follows from
clauses (1) through (3).
The theory can be somewhat simplified if we permit (against Rule 6c, p. 144) a
limiting case of critical discussion, where the initial (positive) standpoint is not
defended by argument but by an application of the intersubjective identification
procedure. That means that the propositional content of the initial standpoint (which
content will henceforth be called the conclusion) might be fixed, and thus might be
successfully defended. It is harmless to count the conclusion as successfully defended
also whenever the initial standpoint has been conclusively defended by argument. Let
5
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7
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argument consists.
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us call each input and also the conclusion an element of the possibly complex
argument. In what follows, a defense of an element (not a link) is to be understood as
a defense of a positive standpoint with regard to that element. It is now possible to
unravel the duplex definition given above by first giving a separate recursive
definition for ‘successfully defended’:
a) (basic clause) Any element that has been fixed counts as having been
successfully defended.
b) (inductive clause) Any element defended by an elementary argument all of
whose inputs were either not called into question (the antagonist having
had every opportunity to do so) or successfully defended counts as having
been successfully defended.
c) (extremal clause) No element shall count as successfully defended, unless
this follows from clauses (a) and (b).
In a second step, it may be stipulated that a positive standpoint counts as having been
conclusively defended if and only if its propositional content counts as having been
successfully defended.
The present notion of conclusive defense is very different from Johnson’s
notion of conclusive argument. None of the necessary conditions discussed by
Johnson (2000, p. 232-234), which he plausibly argued never to have been satisfied,
applies to the present notion. The premises and the connection between premises and
conclusion need not be unimpeachable, rather they must have been either fixed by
agreed procedures or settled by further discussion. A conclusive argumentative
defense in the present sense need not be immune for legitimate criticism; it is only the
present antagonist who sees no further ways of calling inputs of the argument into
question. Nor need a conclusive argumentative defense in the present sense be
generally regarded as a conclusive argument in Johnson’s sense; for its conclusiveness
will remain restricted to a specific dialectical situation. The present notion is of course
theoretical and idealized, but one can imagine something like it to be exemplified in
argumentative practice. Perhaps this notion can support a feasible concluding stage.
5. CONCLUSIVE ATTACK
For the most simple type of critical discussion, with only one initial standpoint, one
protagonist, and one antagonist, the achievement closest to that of producing a
devastating criticism would be that of carrying out a conclusive attack. This notion is
defined in Rule 9b:
The antagonist has conclusively attacked the [complex speech act of
argumentation 8 ] of the protagonist if he has successfully attacked either the
propositional content or the force of justification or refutation of the complex
speech act of argumentation. (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, p. 151.)
The gist of Rule 9b (in the case of a positive standpoint) can be formulated as follows:
If and only if at least one input of a protagonist’s argument has been successfully
attacked by the antagonist, has the antagonist conclusively attacked the argument
presented by the protagonist. To see what it means to successfully attack some input
8
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we must turn to Rules 7b (p. 147) and 8b (p. 150). There we learn that, in order to
count as successfully attacked, an input should upon attack (calling into question) by
the antagonist have failed all tests that were applied to it 9 and, moreover, not have
been successfully defended by the protagonist in a sub-discussion. Moreover, it seems
reasonable to stipulate that the protagonist must have had his say, that is, that he must
have had every opportunity to apply tests and to put forward an argumentative
defense. But also the antagonist must have had her say about the arguments put
forward by the protagonist to defend the attacked input. Otherwise, this input might
not have been successfully defended by an argument merely because the antagonist
lacked the opportunity to challenge some element (see clause (b) in the definition of
‘successfully defended’). In this case it would be premature to say that the attacked
input has been attacked conclusively (even if it has failed its tests).
As in the preceding section, when discussing successful defense, we may
expand also the notion of successful attack so as to apply not only to inputs but also to
the conclusion. Further, we may count a (positive) standpoint as conclusively attacked
if and only if its propositional content was successfully attacked (which implies that
each complex speech act of argumentation put forward as a defense of the standpoint
was conclusively attacked in the sense of Rule 9b).
Now it may be shown that, assuming that both parties had their say, that is,
that they had every opportunity to put forward their defenses and attacks (including
applications of tests), each contested (attacked) element of an argument counts as
successfully attacked if and only if it does not count as successfully defended. For,
given this assumption, a contested element counts as successfully attacked if and only
if (1) it failed all its tests, and (2) no argument for it was presented in which all the
contested inputs were successfully defended (which is what successful defense in a
sub-discussion amounts to). The conjunction of (1) an (2) is again equivalent to the
element’s not counting as successfully defended.
The upshot of this exercise is that, as long as it is assumed that both parties
had their say, successful attack is not an independent notion but, in the domain of
contested elements, just the complement of successful defense. Consequently, the
conclusion, being contested, will either count as successfully defended or as
successfully attacked and the (positive) initial standpoint will either count as
conclusively defended or as conclusively attacked. Does this mean that, once the
discussants enter the concluding stage, the resolution of their difference of opinion is
guaranteed?
6. THE INCONCLUSIVENESS OF CONCLUSIVENESS
One of the predicaments of the concluding stage was whether to take the results of the
argumentation stage for granted, or first to assess them, with the risk of starting the
argument all over again. The pragma-dialecticians take the first option: in critical
discussion the concluding stage is a rather modest affair. On the basis of what
happened in the earlier stages, either the protagonist must retract his initial standpoint,
or the antagonist must retract her calling into question of the initial standpoint, or no
retractions need to be performed. According to Rule 14, the first speech act is
obligatory if and only if the argumentation stage yielded a conclusive attack on the
initial standpoint, whereas the second speech act is obligatory if and only if the
argumentation stage yielded a conclusive defense of the initial standpoint (Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, p. 154).
9
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Only if one of these retractions is performed, does the critical discussion
succeed in achieving a resolution of the difference of opinion. From the preceding
section it is obvious that this will always be the case when each discussant did have
his or her say, that is, if the protagonist had every opportunity to advance arguments
and to apply procedures, and the antagonist had every opportunity to call elements
into question.
The problem then is how to determine when each discussant has had his or her
say. An argument may seem conclusive, but then the antagonist may come up with
new doubt and call into question an element that was previously thought to be
uncontested. Similarly, a seemingly conclusive attack may be undercut when the
protagonist suddenly sees a new possibility for argumentative defense. Thus there is
not much conclusiveness about attacks and defenses being or not being conclusive as
long as some party can still add some contribution. Since the protagonist can always
try a new argumentative defense there is no such thing as an absolutely conclusive
attack, the conclusiveness of an attack always depends on the protagonist’s having
had his say. On the other hand, there can be an absolutely conclusive defense, namely
one in which all the links and all the basic premises (premises that are not
argumentatively defended) are fixed. For in that case new attacks can nowhere be
aimed. But even in that case the conclusiveness need not be everlasting, since the
protagonist could still retract some part of the argument (Rule 12, p. 153).
Perhaps the only way, in critical discussion, to determine the moment for both
discussants to admit to have had their say and to enter the concluding stage is to let
the discussants themselves make the decision. The protocol, which may be started at
any moment during the argumentation stage would run as follows:
X: Let us go to the concluding stage!
Y: OK. (If Y refuses X will have to pay a small fine.)
In the concluding stage it is then simply assumed that each discussant has had his or
her say.
Moreover, it may be stipulated that the discussants move to the concluding
stage, and are supposed to have had their say, as soon as in two consecutive turns both
discussants pass.
The effect of these rulings is that (contrary to what is suggested by Rule 14c,
p. 154) whenever there is a concluding stage the difference of opinion will always be
resolved. This does not mean that critical discussion will always be successful in
resolving the difference of opinion, for there is no guarantee that a concluding stage
will ever be reached. Moreover, the resolution of a difference of opinion is not itself
conclusive, since a discussion may be reopened: ‘an argumentative dispute can in
principle never be settled once and for all’ (p. 138).
To sum up, the pragma-dialectical notion of conclusiveness supports a
feasible, but modest, concluding stage, but will, happily, not prevent discussions from
being reopened and certainly not put issues beyond debate.
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